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European  economies  1919-1939 
The totalitarian states 
The  World Slump  which  started in  Wall  Street in  1929  had  repercussions  on  the 
economies of all the developed countries of the world.  In  all  there had to  be far  more 
governmental regulation,  and,  in  particular,  the  erection of protectionist tariff barriers. 
In Germany and Italy  state  control  went much  further  than  in  the European  democ-
racies:  political  intervention  became  overt  control,·  they  became  autarkies  and 
previous  national  pride  became  fierce  economic  and  political  nationalism  which  led 
inevitably  to  war. 
I.  Nazi totalitarianism 
By  the  end  of  1932  Germany  found  herself  in  a 
very bad position economically,  largely because of the 
withdrawal  of foreign  capital  from  Germany and her 
heavy  indebtedness  to  foreign  creditors.  Bruning's 
measures had not been successful  for the reduction  in 
production and the restriction of foreign trade resulted 
in  six  million  unemployed.  Hitler  became  Chancellor 
in  January  1933  because  he  promised  that  he  would 
find  work for the unemployed and rebuild the economy 
without  inflation.  The  Nazi  programme  of  1921  had 
been a  socialist  one,  but that had long been  jettisoned 
for  Hitler  realised  that he  needed  the  support  of the 
industrialists. The left wing of his party were sacrificed 
in  the  "Night of the  Long Knives"  in  June  1934  and 
his new measures were totalitarian. 
Labour Front 
In  May  1933  the  trade  unions  had  been  declared 
illegal and instead a  Labour Front was  set up:  a  State 
Trade Union with fourteen regional organisations, each 
controlled  by  government-nominated  officials.  The 
rights  which  trade  unions  had won  in  the  past disap-
peared,  for  strikes  were  made  illegal  and wages  were 
fixed  by the State.  Agreements on working hours were 
broken, e.g.  in  the  armament industry a  ten-hour day 
was restored. 
State  control  of industry 
A  government  department,  divided  into  six  sections 
for different types  of production and working through 
regional bodies all  staffed  by party nominees, controll-
ed each private enterprise with production programmes 
and  prices  fixed  by  the  State.  There  was  a  kind  of 
"New Deal", but the overriding aim was  to make the 
State  strong  militarily.  There  was  reorganisation  to 
concentrate  in  larger  units  and  encouragements  such 
as  tax  reductions  and  a  policy  of big  profits.  In  the 
armament  industry  (mainly  Krupp)  the  3.6  per  cent 
dividends  of 1933  became  18.6  per cent  dividends  by 
1939. 
State control of agriculture 
Agriculture  according to  Hitler  was  the  "wet  nurse 
of  the  people"  and  provided  "the  life  blood  of  the 
nation", metaphors which linked together proved to be 
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singularly apt.  Because of his previous promises to the 
farming  community  they  had  largely  supported  his 
rise to power.  Now he asked of them that they should 
feed  entirely a  growing population,  to make Germany 
independent of the importation of one-third of her food 
which had been necessary in the past. 
A  Food  Corporation  was  set  up  with  regional  and 
local groups,  all controlled by  party nominees, and all 
food  producers  and  middlemen  were  compelled  to 
belong  to  it.  Markets  were  reorganised,  prices  fixed, 
production  schedules  enforced,  processing  controlled 
and  the  industrial  requirements  of  farmers  provided. 
There were  drainage and irrigation schemes  and  mar-
ginal land was brought into production. 
A  law  was  introduced  which  linked  small  farmers, 
with  holdings  of  less  than  120  hectares  (300  acres), 
directly  to  the  State,  providing  them  with  the  oppor-
tunity  of obtaining  government  loans  and  security  of 
tenure.  However,  the  farmer was  told exactly  what he 
had to produce and he could not dispose of his holdings 
wholly  or in part without  government permission.  On 
the  whole,  the  small  farmers  were  very  satisfied  for 
the prices of farm products were raised to the level  of 
industrial prices and stabilised, and so farmers' incomes 
were  higher. 
Financial controls 
Control of banks 
The  government  closed  all  banks  to  avoid  further 
panic  in  1931  when  the  Danat  Bank  (formed  by  a 
merger  of  the  Darmstaedter  Bank  and  the  National 
Bank)  had  to  suspend  payments.  They  were  only 
reopened  with  state  permission,  the  government  guar-
anteeing  their  deposits  and  in  certain  cases  lending 
money to bolster them up. 
By  1934 the government controlled two-thirds of the 
banking network  and there  was  a  government  official 
on the Board of every bank. The government controll-
ed the  Danat Bank  which  merged  with  the  Dresdner. 
By  redeeming  short  term  loans  which  banks  had 
imprudently lent to industry, the State became a share-
holder in many industrial concerns. 
The Central Bank remained a private institution, but 
the President and Council were nominated by the gov-
ernment  and  carried  out  its  instructions,  having  the 
sole right to issue currency and the task of controlling 
the exchange of foreign  assets. 
Control of credit 
Hitler's  aims  were  to  end  unemployment,  to  put to 
full  use  all  the  productive  capacity  of Germany  and to  build  up  her  military  strength.  He  relied  on  the 
expertise  of  Doctor  Schacht  to  encourage  industry, 
and  particularly  the  armaments  industries,  by credits 
but  at the  same  time  avoiding  inflation.  A  company 
was  set  up  by  the  Reichsbank  and  the  four  largest 
armament  firms  called  the  Metallsforschung  GmbH. 
This  issued  bills  of exchange  with  which  industrialists 
were paid for work done for the  State.  These  bills  of 
exchange were guaranteed by the government and could 
be  redeemed  through the  banks.  Thus new  credit was 
injected  into  the  economy,  production  increased  and 
unemployment  much  reduced,  but  at  the  same  time 
because  the  amount  of  currency  in  circulation  was 
restricted,  inflation  was  avoided. 
Control of wages  and prices 
Wages were kept low to avoid a  rise in price of the 
scarce consumer goods which were kept in short supply 
as  a  matter  of  government  policy.  In  fact,  the  real 
income  of  those  who  had  not  been  unemployed  fell 
during this  period.  The discipline  of the people  meant 
that not only did  they accept these  shortages but also 
they  saved.  There  was  compulsory  saving  for  15  per 
cent of each wage,  which was  collected by the  Labour 
Front,  the  State  Trade  Union,  to  be  paid  out in  the 
distant future in  the shape of a  "people's car", but in 
addition there  were  other savings  schemes  which were 
well  supported,  for  example,  the  sale  of  government 
bonds  which  paid  tax-free  interest  if  they  were  not 
redeemed  for a  certain fixed  period. 
Taxation was very heavy:  in 1933  it amounted to  12 
per cent of the wage  bill,  in  1936  to  17  per cent, and 
in  1940  to  26  per cent.  The budget deficit  was  turned 
into  a  surplus  in  the  early  years,  but  government 
expenditure grew so rapidly (1933:  8 milliards of marks 
to  1940:  48  milliards)  that  by  1938  there  was  again 
a  deficit  which  the  government  sought  to  defray  by 
short  and  long  term  loans.  The  national  debt  which 
was  11 milliards in 1933 was 48 milliards in 1939. 
Full employment 
The Nazi policy seemed to be successful:  the 8 mil-
lion  unemployed  in  1933  had dwindled  to  400,000  by 
1938  and there  were  none by 1940.  Not only had the 
unemployed been absorbed by the expanded industries 
but also  by public  works:  construction of about 2,000 
miles  of motorways,  aerodromes  and,  from  1936,  the 
Siegfried Line.  At the same time the increasing power 
of the  Party and  of the  Army  led  to  employment  of 
one million  in  1939 for the Party and about the same 
number  for  the  Army  by  the  beginning  of the  War. 
The reorganisation of foreign trade 
In spite of the Hoover Moratorium and the attempts 
by  Chancellor  BrUning,  at deflation,  Germany's  gold 
reserves  which  had  been  3.3  milliards  in  1929  were 
down to 700 millions in January 1933. The conference 
of Lausanne  ended  the  paying  of reparations  but not 
the repayment of sums borrowed under the Dawes and 
Young  Plans.  Devaluation  was  not  possible  because 
of the large  sums  borrowed from abroad in  1930  and 
1931  and because of the large amount of foreign invest-
ment in Germany undertaken previously. 
The  government's  first  step  was  to  get  control  of 
the foreign  assets  of German citizens to offset foreign 
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payments,  and helped  by the confiscations  from  Jews, 
this  was quite successful. 
Secondly,  ASKI  accounts  were  set  up  whereby 
foreign  creditors were  paid off  in these blocked marks 
which  could  only  be  spent  on  German  goods,  thus 
boosting German exports.  Both the United States  and 
Britain refused to accept ASKI marks and so  working 
through a  system  of licensing which  was  in the hands 
of the  Reichsbank,  imports from  these  countries  were 
reduced  and more  so  when  their protectionist policies 
cut  down  their  imports  from  Germany.  Her  trade 
increased  with  those  countries  which  would  accept 
ASKI marks, principally in Central Europe and South 
America,  which  found  traditional  trade  with  Britain 
disappearing as  the result  of imperial preference.  Ger-
many was  able  therefore  to  obtain  a  certain  amount 
of raw materials and food in return for manufactured 
goods. 
The system  of licensing  of imports meant that with 
each  particular  country  imports  and  exports  were 
balanced to avoid the movement of capital. This worked 
very  well  for  trade  with  Brazil,  Chile,  Greece,  Yugo-
slavia  and  Rumania,  and  although  there  was  a  small 
trade deficit  with  France there  was  a  good  surplus  in 
trade with Italy. 
Substitute products 
Germany  was  short  of certain  basic  raw  materials 
and foodstuffs and needed to import a great deal. Two-
thirds of her iron-ore came from  France, Sweden and 
Spain,  all  her bauxite and most  of her other non-fer-
rous  metals,  most of her petroleum, many textiles  and 
all  her  rubber came  from  abroad.  Hitler  saw  that he 
would have to build up stocks of raw materials if he was 
to wage war successfully. There were elaborate schemes 
for the recovery of materials; the very poor deposits of 
iron-ore in Central Germany were expensively develop-
ed by the new Hermann  Goering Steelworks;  the firm 
Farben  made  500,000  tons  of  synthetic  petrol  up  to 
the  outbreak  of the  war;  the  Buna  synthetic  rubber 
was  made from  1937  onwards;  there was  the develop-
ment of man-made fibres  and various substitute foods 
were  developed,  including  ersatz  coffee  made  partly 
from acorns. 
Germany's comparative success 
There  was  tremendous  industrial  expansion  after 
the slump:  with the index at 100 in  1929,  it was  only 
60 in 1933  but up to 140 in 1939.  Most of the increase 
had  been  in  the  armament  industries  and  by  1939 
Germany  spent  21  per  cent  of her  national  revenue 
on arms,  compared with  the  7 to  9.  per cent spent by 
France,  the  USSR  and  Britain.  The rapid increase  in 
production  can be  seen  from  the following: 
Coal 
Steel 
Iron-ore 
Aluminium 
Motor vehicles 
1932 
100 m.t. 
5 m.t. 
2  m.t. 
15,000  tons 
50,000 
1939 
190  m.t. 
23  m.t.a 
15  m.t. 
200,000  tons 
350,000 
a  USA:  29  m.t., URSS:  21  m.t., UK: 13.5 m.t., France: 6.3 m.t. The financial  circuit in  Germany 1934-1939 
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The establishment of exchange control  in  Italy 
"The balance of trade situation is bad  ... How should 
this situation be met? ... If  we do not keep our internal 
prices  and  our costs  in  step  with  the  costs  of world 
production, we  cannot hope for a  revival of our trade. 
The necessary equalization can only be effected  either 
by  internal  restraints  on prices  and  the  cost  of pro-
ducts,  or by devaluation of the currency.  And as  we 
have already rejected the second of these  alternatives, 
because  we  believe  all  countries  will  be  obliged  to 
return  to gold  and  because  flexible  currencies  cannot 
last for ever, it is  on the first  possibility that we  must 
concentrate  ... 
Let us  come,  now,  to a  delicate question.  When no 
goods are exported, who  pays for the goods which we 
are obliged to import? For import we must. Let us have 
no  illusions  about  our  self-sufficiency  as  a  nation. 
Thanks to the prodigious advance of science,  all  mod-
ern  nations  are able  to  claim  a  measure  of self-suffi-
ciency.  But we,  pending proof to the contrary, need to 
import liquid  fuel.  We are prospecting to see  if there 
is oil in the country. If there is,  we shall develop it; if 
there  isn't,  we  shall  resign  ourselves...  Coal,  liquid 
fuel,  wool,  cotton,  iron:  five  commodities  that  weigh 
in the scale of imports.  We can reduce the figure,  but 
not by much. Now, the balance-the balance of trade-
must  be  settled  with  goods  or  with  services  or  with 
gold ... We have suffered a drain of approximately 700 
million lire in gold.  Positive factors  account for about 
two  thirds  of  this  draining  away  of  our  reserves.  A 
third, however, is due to certain gentlemen-all the more 
despicable  in  that  they  are  "gentlemen":  they  have 
lately taken to speculating in banknotes, which we have 
been obliged  to  buy back in  foreign  markets. We are 
today taking measures against them. 
Under  two  decrees  in  course  of  promulgation  no 
currency  exchange  transactions  may  be  carried  out 
unless  they  correspond  to  a  real  need  in  trade  or 
industry,  or are required  for  the  purposes  of foreign 
travel.  The export  of banknotes  or cheques  is  prohi-
bited, as is the acquisition in foreign markets of foreign 
and Italian securities  issued  abroad  ...  " 
Speech  by Mussolini 
in  the  Chamber of Deputies,  26 May  1934 
On the IRI  (Institute for Industrial  Reconstruction) 
"During and after the war,  banks of Italy ceased to 
engage in banking... On the contrary, the Italian banks 
-perhaps with  the aim of assisting  industry-suffered 
from a serious surfeit of industrial shares, shares whose 
rating on the stock exchange had collapsed. 
What happened  then?  This  plethora  of shares  was 
unloaded onto an Institute,  previously designated  "for 
liquidation" and now called "for industrial reconstruc-
tion". This Institute has two sections, one which I shall 
call  the  "hospital"  section  and  the  other  the  "conva-
lescent"  section,  and  thanks  to  this  measure  all  the 
banks are today able to start banking again  ...  " 
Speech of 26 May 1934 However,  Germany  was  still  dependent  on  foreign 
sources for all  her bauxite, manganese and nickel;  for 
80  per cent of her copper; 70  per cent of her iron-ore; 
65  per cent of her petrol  and rubber and 50  per cent 
of her textiles. Even though in  Goering's phrase it  was 
to  be  "guns  before  butter"  and  even  though,  for 
example  since  1933  potato  production  had  increased 
by 30 per cent and the production of sugar beet doubl-
ed, 20 per cent of her food was still being imported in 
1939. 
Industrialists  and  farmers  were  happy  but  other 
workers  and  professional  people  were  worse  off  than 
in 1933, for although prices had been kept fairly stable, 
having  risen  by  only  8  per  cent,  wages  and  salaries 
had been allowed  to  rise  by only 2.5  per cent. 
By  1939  there were  ominous signs  and Dr. Schacht, 
the  minister  of economic  affairs,  handed  over  to  Dr. 
Funk, although the guiding hand was  to be Goering's. 
There was a serious risk of inflation, for the amount of 
money  in  circulation  had  risen  from  4.7  milliards  of 
marks  in  1933  to  14  milliards  in  1939,  although  the 
amount of consumer goods produced had increased by 
only 20  per cent in the same time. The mark only kept 
its value abroad because Germany was isolated in trade 
from  the chief  markets  and  the  ASKI  marks  were  a 
device to hide the devaluation which had in fact taken 
place.  Wages  and  prices  were  kept  fairly  stable  only 
because  of government control of industry which pre-
vented  strikes.  By  1939,  Germany's gold  reserves were 
very low-she had a huge national debt and the budget 
deficit  had  reappeared. 
For Hitler war was  not only  possible  (since  he had 
the  war machine  ready),  but it became necessary  and 
particularly so  when countries would no longer accept 
payment in  ASKI marks:  Germany needed  to  occupy 
territory where the products would rapidly complement 
Germany's, before other countries were  ready for war 
too. 
II. Italian state control 
During the War, as in the other European countries, 
the amount of money in circulation rose  tremendously 
from 3 milliards  lires  in  1913  to  22  milliards  in  1920, 
and  of course  there  had been  the  resultant  inflation. 
Italy had an adverse balance of trade,  and there were 
other  causes  of  discontent,  chiefly  the  Peace  Treaty 
which deprived Italy of !stria and the Dalmatian Coast, 
and the inability of the government to cure unemploy-
ment,  to  fit  ex-service  men  into  civilian  life,  or  to 
settle  the  agrarian  problems  of  the  South.  Thus  the 
discredited  government  could  do  nothing  to  prevent 
the Fascists from coming to power in 1922. 
Mussolini's  monetary  policy 
Mussolini  had  some  success  in  consolidating  the 
national debt but he did  nothing to  control the banks 
who  allowed  too  much  credit.  If anything,  Mussolini 
aggravated  the  situation,  when  in  1926  he  started  a 
vigorous  policy of deflation:  the  Bank of Italy was  to 
control credits allowed by other banks and was to have 
the sole right to issue currency, prices were to be con-
trolled by law, the amount of money in circulation was 
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to  be  reduced  and  the  budget  was  balanced.  Foreign 
speculative  capital  came  into  the  country  and  the 
government was  able to borrow from American banks 
for public work schemes. 
Control of the economy 
Until the World Slump,  the Italian Government did 
not  interfere  very  effectively  in  the  economy.  New 
public works  such as  the motorways and new building 
in Rome  were  for  prestige  rather than economic  rea-
sons.  There  were  subsidies  for  exports  to  avoid  the 
handicap  of  high  prices  which  came  from  an  over-
valued  currency.  It was  only  the  creation  of a  public 
enterprise, AGIP, for refining and undertaking research 
in  petroleum  products,  which  presented  some  innova-
tion. 
In  1925,  the  "Battle  for  Wheat"  was  started,  an 
attempt to step  up  production,  in  the  main by credits 
to  speed  up  the  adoption  of new  techniques,  but this 
was  really  a  continuation  of  pre-fascist  policies.  The 
new  ideology  was  bound  to  have  an  effect  on  trade 
unions since individual rights were to be submerged in 
the  general  good.  To begin  with,  in  1922,  employers' 
and employees'  associations  were  merged  in  the party 
organisation. In 1925  by the Palace Vidoni Agreement 
between  the  State  and  the  confederation  of  Italian 
industries,  industrialists  were  to  recognise  only  fascist 
trade  unions;  in  return  the  right  to  strike  was  with-
drawn and all labour disputes were to go to arbitration. 
The Rocco law of 1927  set up a state system of social 
insurance against sickness, accident, unemployment and 
old age, financed by levies on employers and employees, 
with  a  contribution  by  the  State  In  this  so-called 
Charter of Labour, conditions of work were laid down 
including  rates  of pay,  hours  of  work  and holidays. 
Corporate  organisations 
A  basic  feature  of  fascist  ideology  was  that  class 
warfare  would  be  replaced  by community  unity  and 
action:  there was  to  be the fruitful  cooperation of all 
producers under the paternal surveillance of the State. 
In  1930,  the  National  Council  of  Corporations  was 
set  up,  presided  over  by  Mussolini.  There were  seven 
divisions,  one for each field  of economic activity,  e.g., 
heavy industry, agriculture, commerce, transport, bank-
ing.  Each had a council of members nominated by the 
party and representing employers, employees, ministries 
and  the  Party  itself.  The  National  Council  was  the 
policy-making body,  deciding  schedules  of production, 
controlling imports, and fixing  prices.  In 1934,  twenty-
two  corporations  were  set  up  in  various  industries, 
again with councils of nominated members representing 
employers and employees. The State trade unions were 
organised  in  provincial  associations,  federations  and 
nine  national  confederations,  and  at each  stage  gov-
ernment nominees were in charge. Mussolini could boast 
that the  State  controlled  all  the  actions  and thoughts 
of all  Italians from  birth  to  death.  Not only was  the 
economy under strict control but leisure persuits  were 
organised by a  special organisation, the "Dopolavoro". 
Also, all young boys were in paramilitary organisations, 
the  "Babillas",  "Avanguardisti"  and  Italian  Youth, 
catering for  them  from  the  age  of eight  until  the age 
of  military  service. In  the  period  until  1929,  people  were  reasonably 
content: there was  security although they had to accept 
a  gradual lowering of real wages. 
The world crisis 
Italy was  affected  earlier  than  France  or  Germany 
because her devaluation in  1927  had not been enough 
and  therefore  Italian  exports  were  priced  too  highly 
abroad.  The invisible  exports which  had made up  for 
the trade deficit shrank for there were far fewer tourists, 
and also many of the Italians abroad were out of work 
and could not send money home.  There was  the flight 
of capital from Italy and the  gold  reserves which had 
been  12  milliard  of  lire  in  1929,  by  1934  were  only 
7 milliard. 
Like  France and  Germany,  Italy refused to devalue 
and chose instead a  policy of rigorous deflation.  How-
ever,  the  fall  in prices  in  Italy did not match the  fall 
in  world prices,  industrial production declined  and by 
1932  six  per cent of the work force,  i.e.,  1.3  millions, 
were unemployed, leading to a lowering of consumption 
on the home market, which in turn meant even lower 
production and thus  more unemployment. 
The setting  up  of the IRI 
There  was  a  banking  crisis  because  of  the  with-
drawal  of  deposits.  The  banks  called  in  their  short 
term loans and therefore many businesses  were  totter-
ing.  In 1930,  as  an interim measure, there were special 
credits  to  the  bigger  banks  to  help  them  to  reassure 
their depositors. 
In 1931,  the /stituto Mobilare Italiano  was  set up to 
provide long term loans to industry. With the provision 
of state capital,  the Bank of Italy became a  semi-state 
institution with government-appointed nominees on the 
board, while the control of the Bank of Italy over the 
other banks was made much stronger. 
But the  main  action  taken  by  the  government  was 
the  creation  of  the  IRI  (lstituto  per  la  Ricostruzione 
Industria/e), a public enterprise obtaining its funds from 
the  State and from loans with  the aim of centralising 
the industrial holdings of the  banks and to  make long 
term loans to  industry.  This was  a  crisis  measure  and 
at  first  the  intention  was  that  these  state  holdings 
should be sold to the public at the first possible oppor-
tunity,  but  from  1937  onwards  this  was  the  method 
by  which  the  State  extended  its  control  over  other 
industries  which  were  provided  with  more  capital  for 
expansion. In this way,  Finsider (for the steel industry) 
and Finmare (for the merchant navy) were set up. 
Exchange control 
In  May  1934  Mussolini  decreed  exchange  control: 
no  capital  was  to  leave  Italy  and  trade  was  strictly 
controlled.  Imports  were  to  be  limited  to  the  barest 
necessities for civilians, to military requirements and to 
raw materials which could be processed and re-export-
ed.  Because  the  attack  on Ethiopia (which  led  to eco-
nomic  sanctions  by  the  League  of  Nations  against 
Italy, although they were  not completely implemented) 
her  trade  with  the  United  States,  France  and  Britain 
declined. Her trade with her African colonies increased 
but, more significantly,  her trade with  Germany grew, 
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in  spite  of  differences  between  Italy  and  Germany 
over  Austria.  By  1939,  Germany  provided  Italy  with 
27  per cent of her imports and took 20  per cent of her 
exports. 
The devaluation of 1936 
The policy of rearmament meant even  higher prices 
at home and higher prices for exports. The trade defi-
cit became  bigger  and by  1935  the gold  reserves  were 
down to 5 milliards,  or 40  per cent of the  1929  level. 
The position was  aggravated by the devaluation of the 
French Franc on September 27,  1936,  followed  by the 
devaluation  by the  Netherlands  and  Switzerland,  and 
on  October 5,  1936  Italy devalued  by 40  per cent.  At 
the same time the threat of effective economic sanctions 
pushed  Italy  more  and  more  towards  a  policy  of 
autarky:  Mussolini  saw  the  need to become more and 
more self-sufficient for military reasons. 
The Battle for Wheat, started in 1925  to try to meet 
the  food  deficit,  was  intensified.  The  draining  of  the 
Pontine  Marshes  had  been  started  in  1930  and  corn 
production was raised from 5 million tons to 8 millions. 
The growing of cotton was begun. Small holdings were 
consolidated,  and  improved  methods  were  introduced, 
and irrigation schemes were tried in the colonies. 
Italy  still  lacked  raw  materials.  She  made  synthetic 
rubber,  increased  the  mining  of coal  in  Tuscany  and 
Sardinia (the new town of Sulcis grew up), iron ore was 
exploited  in  Elba  and  Tuscany  and  imported  from 
Franco  Spain  in  return  for  military  assistance  in  the 
Civil  War,  and Italy became  one of the  world's  fore-
most producers of mercury and bauxite. Through IRI, 
the  State helped  the  steel  and  chemical  industries,  by 
and large the private consumer's needs were neglected: 
as with Germany it was to be "guns before butter". 
Italy's balance sheet in  1939 
The problem of unemployment had not been solved: 
in spite of a  much larger army and the colonisation of 
African possessions, including Ethiopia, the many pub-
lic works, the efforts of IRI and the new 40 hour work-
ing  week,  there  were  still  600,000  totally  unemployed 
and many on short-time working in 1939. 
The  chemical  industry  did  well,  but  the  total  steel 
production  was  only  2.3  million  tons  (Germany:  23 
million).  Italy had produced 60,000  motor  vehicles  in 
1929, but in 1939 only 10,000 more, and the textile and 
other industries had stagnated. 
Prices had gone up a  great deal.  The price of wheat 
rose  by 50  per cent  between  1934  and  1939,  when  it 
was double the price of Canadian and American wheat. 
Prices generally rose by 70  per cent between  1934  and 
1938,  when  an  attempt  was  made  to  stabilise  prices. 
The budget deficit rose steadily and there was a greatly 
increased national debt. 
Progress in synthetic materials and the use of recover-
ed materials was not as great as in Germany, and above 
all nothing had really been done to improve the lot of 
the people in the impoverished South. 
Although  by  temperament  Mussolini  would  have 
liked  to  join  early  on  when  the  Second  World  War 
started,  in  what  seemed  to  him  to  be  an  adventure, 
his  knowledge  of  Italy's  weaknesses  made  him  more 
prudent. He waited until 1940 when he thought victory 
for  Germany was  certain:  a  mistake  which  left  Italy 
in a  sorry state five  years later. Public  enterprises 
and  the  European 
European  studies,  12,  1971. 
in  Britain 
Community 
The  most  striking  difference  between  public  enterprises  in  Britain  and  the  Common 
Market is  not in  the  structure  of the  Corporations  themselves,  but in  the  attitudes adopted 
towards them by ordinary  people  and political parties. 
In  Britain  people  adopt views  about nationalised  indus-
tries  with  almost  religious  fervour  and,  perhaps  for  that 
reason,  rarely  change  their  views  as  a  result  of  rational 
argument.  One  of  the  few  distinguishing  features  of  the 
two  main  political  parties,  Labour  and  Conservative,  in 
recent  years  has  been  their  approach  to  the  public  sector. 
During  the  years  of Labour administration  from  1964  to 
1970,  State intervention in  the running of the public sector 
increased;  the  steel  industry  was  re-nationalised  (having 
been denationalised under the previous Conservative admin-
istration) and State shareholdings  were  acquired  in  a  vari-
ety of industries  from  computers to  North Sea  gas. 
With all the predictability  of a  pendulum,  the Conserv-
ative  Government  threw  this  trend  into  reverse  in  1970 
and embarked on a  policy of disengagement from industry 
and  selling  off  State  shareholdings  private  industry. 
In stark contrast to this,  the expansion of publicly-owned 
enterprises  in  most  Common  Market  countries  has  been 
helped  by  the  relative  freedom  in  Europe  of  doctrinal 
controversy  about  the  ownership  of  industry.  In  France 
and Italy,  large  sectors  of the economy are  owned  by the 
Government  (and  to  a  lesser  extent  even  in  Germany  in 
spite  of its  non-interventionist  traditions),  yet  few  acts  of 
nationalisation  have  taken  place  as  a  result  of  political 
controversy.  There  are  exceptions-such  as  nationalisation 
of the railways  by the French Popular Front in  1937-and 
electricity generation by the Italian Left-Center coalition in 
1964,  but these  were  exceptions rather than the  rule.  Con-
versely,  there  have  been  few  acts  of denationalisation  for 
political reasons,  except possibly in Germany where shares 
in  some  State  holdings  (like  Volkswagen)  have  been  sold 
off.  It is,  perhaps,  surprising that Britain-where pragmat-
ism  is  so  enshrined-should  play  such  havoc  with  key 
industries by alternatively nationalising and denationalising. 
The  reasons  for  the  differences  in approach  are  largely 
historical-the  Labour  Party  in  Britain  is  steeped  in  tra-
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ditions  of  public  ownership-to  the  extent  that  every 
membership card still has printed on it the  avowed  aim to 
secure the common ownership of the "means of production, 
distribution  and  exchange".  Such clear-cut  policy is  bound 
to  produce in the other party an equal and  opposite  reac-
tion. 
Another reason  is  that  Britain  underwent  her industrial 
revolution earlier than the rest of Europe and at that time 
was  able  to  proclaim  lofty  principles  of free  trade  from 
a position of strength. Continental countries, spurred by the 
need  to  catch  up  fast,  developed  more  closely  under  the 
protective wing  of the  State,  which erected tariff walls. 
At  the  same  time,  in  France,  links  between  State  and 
Industry were consolidated  by what amounted  to  an "Old 
Boys"  network  in  the  Polytechnics  and  other  "Grandes 
Ecoles"  whose  highly  trained  graduates  were  to  be found 
in  influential  posts  in  private  industry  and  Government 
departments, often crossing from one to the other. 
Such overlapping between  the public and private  sectors 
was helped by the fact that the structure of politics produc-
ed a  multitude of parties (unlike the largely two-party sys-
tem in Britain) and with one party rarely in sole command, 
conflicting  policies  towards  the  public  sector  hardly  had 
time to develop. 
Size of 
the public enterprise sector 
Reliable  figures  to  describe  the  exact  size  of  public 
enterprise  activity  in  Europe,  and  especialJy  comparisons 
between  individual  countries  are  difficult  to  come  by 
because of the paucity of up to date statistics.  Nevertheless, it is  true to  say  that public enterprises account for  a  large 
and  growing  amount  of  investment  and  a  substantial, 
though less  large, proportion of the labour force.  The pub-
lic sector grows partly by making new acquisitions (like the 
ever-active  IRI  group  in  Italy,  which  is  owned  by  the 
Government)  or  simply  because  the  industries  in  State 
ownership, such as telecommunications, electricity and steel, 
are precisely  tho~e with  high  growth  rates. 
In  France,  public  enterprises,  with  12  per  cent  of  the 
country's  labour  force,  account  for  over  33  per  cent  of 
total investment; in Italy, with 8 per cent of the workforce, 
they  take  up  nearly  30  per  cent  of investment,  and  even 
in  Germany  (where  some  people  are  surprised  to  find  a 
public  sector at all)  they  account  for  over  18  per  cent  of 
investment  and  seven  per  cent  of  the  labour  force.  In 
Luxembourg,  public  enterprises  account  for  26  per  cent 
of investment,  in  Belgium  13.5  per cent,  and  in  Holland 
21  per cent. 
In  Britain,  there  is  a  certain  degree  of controversy  in 
establishing  the  true  size  of  the  public  sector  and,  more 
especially,  how  fast  it  is  expanding  relative  to  the  private 
sector. The guts of the dispute can be seen in the following 
figures  which  show  the  share  of  Public  Corporations  in 
the  country's  stock  of  capital,  expressed  as  a  percentage 
of  the  private  sector. 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
38.8  per cent 
38.5  per cent 
44.5  per cent 
43.7  per cent 
43.6  per cent 
43.7  per cent 
43.7  per cent 
44.5  per cent 
53.0  per cent 
53.8  per cent 
55.5  per cent 
On the face of it, these figures show a substantial increase 
by  the  public  sector-from 38.8  per  cent  in  1959  to  55.5 
per cent in 1969.  However, the earlier figure  does  not con-
tain the Post Office  which  was  reclassified  in  1961  from  a 
Government  department  to  a  public  corporation.  This 
accounts  for the  sharp  rise  between  1960  and  1961  which 
did  not reflect  any  increase  in  the  real  size  of the  public 
sector,  simply  a  reclassification.  Secondly,  the  big  jump 
between  1966  and  1967  is  accounted  for  by  the national-
isation of steel.  Thus, it has been argued, that if you com-
pared 1969 with a  much earlier year,  1951  (when steel hap-
pened to be nationalised) and allowed for the reclassification 
of the  Post  Office,  a  quite  different  trend  would  emerge. 
Different approaches to the public sector 
Although there are big problems in making comparisons, 
it is  probably true that Britain has  at least as big a  public 
sector as  France or Italy,  where  State  involvement  on  the 
Continent  is  highest.  The  similarities  in  size,  however, 
conceal  significant  differences  in  the  pattern.  In  Germany, 
France and Italy there is  considerable State involvement in 
banking,  insurance  and  commerce,  yet  virtually  none  in 
Britain,  apart  from  the  Bank  of  England.  In  Germany, 
France and  Italy,  the  State,  directly  or indirectly  is  trying 
to  build  up  a  national  capability  in  the  oil  industry,  to 
which there is  no counterpart in Britain-except, of course, 
the  Government's  "sleeping"  participation in  British Petro-
leum of which it owns 49  per cent of the shares. 
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Similary there is  no counterpart in Britain to the  French 
Government's  ownership  of  Renault-one  of  the  most 
successful  motor  manufacturing  companies  in  Europe.  In 
Italy, the State owns  67  per cent of the shipbuilding indus-
try whereas  in  Britain,  even  under a  Labour Government, 
the only shipyards which come into public hands are those 
in  dire  straits  which  a  somewhat  reluctant  Government 
buys out of trouble. 
There are  other differences.  In Britain and France, pub-
lic enterprises tend to be separate units, while in Italy most 
of them are attached to three large groups which form the 
main  instrument  for  controlling  the  public  sector:  IRI,  a 
huge  conglomerate  of  public  and  private  capital  with 
interests  in  steel,  engineering,  motorways,  ships  and  air-
craft;  ENEL,  for  electricity,  and  ENI  for  oil  and natural 
gas.  In France and  Italy,  publicly-owned  Corporations are 
used  extensively  as  part  of  national  planning  exercises. 
Italian  State  industries  devote  40  per  cent  of  their  new 
investments, for instance, to the development of the depress-
ed South in a  pump priming operation  intended  to  attract 
private  capital in its  wake. 
French State owned companies like Renault are expected 
to  behave  like  commercial  concerns  in  their  day-to-day 
operations,  but  there  is  deep  State  involvement  in  their 
pricing  policies,  wage  negotiations  and  investment  plans. 
Sometimes  they  are  used  as  the  unwilling  instruments  of 
Government policy as recently when the Government order-
ed Renault to hand over some of its shares tb the workers, 
in  spite  of the  fact  that  such  a  move  was  not supported 
either  by  management  or unions,  which  regarded  it  as  a 
potential  threat  to  their  power  of  collective  bargaining. 
One common  trend in  the  approach  of Governments  to 
nationalised  Corporations  is  a  desire  to  see  them  operate 
as  commercially  as  possible.  In  Germany,  this  is  easy 
because  the public  sector is  relatively  small  and indirectly 
run  through  holding  groups  which  are  in  part  privately 
owned.  In Italy,  it is  encouraged  through  groups  like  IRI 
operating at arms' length from  the Government and enter-
ing many projects in partnership with  private capital.  This 
tends to  blur the distinction between the public and private 
sectors  and  make  quantitative  assessments  all  the  more 
difficult. 
In  Britain,  successive  Governments  have-rather unsuc-
cessfully-tried to disengage from the day-to-day operations 
of public corporations, leaving them to  get on with the job 
without  time-wasting  interference. 
History 
In  general  there  has  been  no  consistent  policy  among 
States of the  Community or in  Britain  towards  the organ-
isation  or extension  of  the  public  sector.  It was  in  order 
to  stimulate  new  industries  before,  during  or  after  wars, 
or in response  to  economic crises  (as  witness  the  national-
isation in  1971  of Rolls  Royce  in  Britain)  that most State 
enterprises were established. The crises of the 1930s spawn-
ed  publicly  owned  finance  houses  and  also  the  injection 
of public capital into  extractive industries like  coal,  where 
financial  failure  could  have  provoked  a  chain  reaction. 
This  supplemented  an  earlier  round  of  public  ownership 
in the 19th century of postal and telegraph services  where 
a  combination  of  security  and  economics  suggested  a 
solution  involving  public  ownership.  More  recently,  the 
demands  of regional  development or the creation of inter-
national  joint  ventures  (like  the  Concorde)  have  pushed 
Government  involvement  deeper  into  industry. Legal  characteristics 
of public enterprises 
Public  enterprise:;-that  is,  concerns  in  which  public 
authorities have a major share of the capital or management 
-are found in three different forms in Europe. 
1.  Enterprises  which,  however  much  they  may  control 
their own budgets, are really run along the lines of Govern-
ment  Departments.  The Stationery  Office  in  Britain  would 
come under this  category  and so,  until its  recent  elevation 
to corporation status, would the Post Office.  In France, this 
would apply to  postal  and telephone  services  and the pro-
duction  of  explosives,  coins  and  medals.  In  Belgium,  it 
would  include  postal  services  and  the  central  supplies 
office.  In  Italy,  it would  cover  railways,  post  and  certain 
State monopolies,  and  to  the  Federal  Railways  and postal 
services  in Germany. 
2.  The  biggest  category  probably  is  those  enterprises 
whose ownership is  vested in the  State, but which in prac-
tice  operate  on  private  lines.  This  would  include  banks, 
insurance companies and Renault in France, and electricity, 
gas,  coal,  Post  Office,  railways  etc.  in  Britain. 
3.  The so  called  "mixed  economy.,  companies  in which 
ownership  is  shared  between  public  and  private  capital 
often  through  the  establishment  of  limited  liability  com-
panies.  This  is  the  trendiest  form  of  public  participation 
with  the biggest  prospects  for  the future.  Such  a  category 
embraces the German car giant,  Volkswagen,  in which the 
Government  still  has  a  small  stake,  the IRI conglomerate 
in  Italy, the French oil company Total, and the companies 
in  Britain in  which  the  Industrial  Reorganisation  Corpora-
tion took a  stake.  This form of approach is  being adopted 
by the Conservative administration in Britain-though as a 
means of reducing rather than increasing the public sector. 
The present British Government is  planning, eventually, to 
make nationalised concerns  like  the  British Steel  Corpora-
tion to sell  some  of their shares  to  private interests,  espe-
cially in their ancilliary activities. 
Employment 
It will come as something of a surprise to those who look 
on Germany as a  citadel of non-intervention, to learn that 
West  Germany  has  more  wage-earners  employed  in  the 
public  sector  than  any  other  country  in  the  Common 
Market. Nearly 1.8  million people in Germany are employ-
ed in the public sector, compared with 1.4 million in France 
and less  than 1 million in Italy.  Germany, of course has a 
bigger population--60 millions  against  53  millions  in  Italy 
and  50  millions  in  France-but  this  hardly  explains  the 
full difference. 
Part of the reason is  that Germany has a higher propor-
tion  (62  per  cent)  of  wage-earners  employed  in  labour 
intensive  parts  of  the  public  sector  like  transport  and 
communications;  the  average  for  the  Community  is  57 
per cent. 
Germany also  has  a  disproportionately  high  number  of 
public  employees  in energy  industries  compared with,  say, 
Italy which has very few  coal mines. 
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Investment 
Tentative figures  suggest that the public sector in Europe 
(relatively)  invests  much more  than  the  private  sector.  In 
Germany,  the  public  sector  account  for  over  22  per cent 
of all  productive investment in  spite  of the fact  that State 
involvement in manufacturing industry is minute. In France, 
public enterprises account for nearly  30  per cent of invest-
ment. Overall public enterprises account for about a quarter 
of Community  investment.  This  reflects  the  deep  involve-
ment of public enterprises in areas requiring massive infra-
structures  like  power,  transport  and  communications  and 
the  importance  which  attaches  to  them  in  any  policy  for 
coordinated European development. 
The strength 
of public enterprises 
in  individual  sector 
1.  Energy  and mining 
Apart  from  oil,  which  is  largely  in  private  hands,  the 
public sector dominates in the fields of power and coalmin-
ing,  with 90  per cent in France, 84  per cent in the Nether-
lands, 77 per cent in Luxembourg, 50 per cent in Germany, 
and  a  little  over  50  per cent  in Italy.  In  Britain,  there  is 
100  per  cent  public  ownership  of  coalmining,  electricity 
generating and gas. 
2.  Industry 
In France  the Government has  control over 55  per cent 
of the aircraft industry,  including  big  stakes  in  SNECMA 
and Aerospatiale; 40 per cent of the motor industry, includ-
ing  all  of Renault which  in  tum has  links  with  Peugeot; 
10  per  cent  of  the  chemical  industry;  and  also  wields 
effective  price  control  of other  areas,  including  steel. 
In Germany the State owns over  34  per cent of shipyard 
production;  between  20  and 30  per cent of motor produc-
tion, including a  minority holding in Volkswagen, Europe's 
most  successful  car  company;  9  per  cent  of  non-ferrous 
metals;  10  per cent of chemicals;  and 5.5  per cent of iron 
smelting. 
In  the  Netherlands  the  Government  has  37.5  per  cent 
of the metallurgical industry and 9.4 per cent of chemicals. 
In  Italy,  State  involvement  in  industry  is  particularly 
high. The Government owns 66  per cent of basic steel pro-
duction,  including  the  Finsider  group;  95  per cent  of  the 
castings  industry;  well  over  two  thirds  of  shipyard  pro-
duction;  50  per cent  of railway  plant  production;  30  per 
cent of electronics;  15  per cent of cement;  90  per cent of 
synthetic  rubber;  22  per  cent  of aircraft;  21  per cent  of 
petrol refining, and extensive interests also in other sectors. 
In  Britain,  the  State  owns  over  90  per  cent  of  crude 
steel-making  capacity;  a  couple  of  shipyards;  all  of  the 
aero  engine  capacity  (through  Rolls  Royce);  a  minority 
holding in ICL, the biggest computer company outside  the United  States;  a  49  per  cent  stake  in  British  Petroleum, 
whose  oil  reserves  are  bigger  than  any  other  company; 
and  a  string  of  investments  in  engineering  companies 
resulting  from  the  activities  of the  now-defunct  Industrial 
Reorganisation  Corporation. 
3. Transport and communications 
Roughly 73  per cent are Government owned in Germany, 
65  per cent in France, 62  per cent in Italy,  64  per cent in 
Belgium,  60  per cent  in  Luxembourg  and  46  per  cent  in 
the Netherlands. All postal and telecommunications services, 
railways and urban transport are publicly owned practically 
everywhere.  The public  sector  has  the  lion's  share  of air 
transport  through  companies  like  Air  France,  Alitalia, 
Lufthansa,  BEA  and  BOAC.  Ports  and  airports  are  gen-
erally publicly-owned. 
4.  Finance, commerce and services 
Apart  from  in  Britain,  public  services  have  a  decisive 
place  in  finance.  Some  60  per  cent  of  bank  deposits  in 
France are made in the public sector through such agencies 
as the Banque Nationale de  Paris,  the Credit Lyonnais and 
the Societe  Generale. 
Over 52  per cent of the deposits in Germany and 30  per 
cent in the Netherlands, 50  per cent in Belgium and 55  per 
cent in  Italy are in  the  public  sector. Insurance premiums 
received  by  public  enterprises  amount  to  40  per  cent  of 
all  premiums  in  France,  25  per cent in  Italy,  10  per cent 
in Germany and 11  per cent in Belgium. 
However,  in  commerce  and  service  industries  generally, 
public enterprises make only a brief appearance. 
British public enterprises and the Common Market 
Until fairly  recently it had been  thought  that the  sheer 
size of some British public enterprises like the British Steel 
Corporation would  be an  obstacle to entry into  the  Com-
mon  Market.  This  is  not  so.  The  disappearance  of tariff 
barriers  would  create  increased  competition  for  British 
steel  which  would  have  under  one fifth  of the  market in 
the  enlarged  Community.  In  any  case,  nationalisation  of 
steel in Britain triggered off rationalisation moves in Europe 
which  has  resulted  in  some  very  large  companies  being 
formed-in  Germany  for  instance-,  which  are  all  too 
capable of providing fierce  competition for the BSC. 
What  the  Common  Market  Commission  in  Brussels 
objects  to  is  not  the  ownership  or  structure  of the  BSC 
(public  ownership,  as  we  have  seen,  is  a  common  phe-
nomenon  in  Europe)  but  the  deep  involvement  of  the 
British  Government  in  the  affairs  of  the  BSC  and  espe-
cially  its  policy  of cutting  back  price  increases.  Provided 
the  Government  can  fulfill  its  promise  of  disengaging  in 
industry  there  is  no  reason  why  Britain's  nationalised 
corporations  should  not play  an  active  part in  the  Com-
munity's  affairs. 
Indeed the entry of a  strong  British  public sector could 
possibly  give  a  much  needed  impetus  to  the  development 
of  the  Community's  Industrial  Policy  which  has  so  far 
made  painfully  slow  progress.  The  EEC  Commission  has 
far  reaching  proposals  to  sweep  away  non-tariff  barriers 
to trade, harmonise fiscal  policies and set about restructur-
ing industry along transnational lines. 
Public corporations as such do  not figure  very largely in 
these  plans  at  present,  except  in  a  negative  sense-the 
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Commission  wants  to  see  them  abandon  their  custom  of 
only ordering supplies from companies of their own nation-
ality.  This is  regarded as  a  big  obstacle towards the estab-
lishment  of a  true  common  market  in  technology  goods. 
British nationalised corporations are as bad as  any when 
it  comes  to  "Buying  British"  as  can  be  seen  from  the 
nationalistic  purchasing policies  of the Post Office  and the 
Central Electricity Generating Board when they buy equip-
ment.  But  at least,  if Britain  enters  the  Common  Market, 
public enterprises  will  be  able to  partake fully  in  the dis-
cussions  leading  to  the  implementation  of  an  Industrial 
Policy. 
Are nationalised industries efficient? 
There will  never  be  satisfactory answer  to this  question 
because  of the  mystical  fervour  with  which  the  argument 
is  conducted  in  Britain.  Many  people  still  regard  nation-
alised  industries  as  being  inefficient  almost  by  definition. 
Others point to the steady progress being made by countries 
in Europe towards making them more commercial  in their 
operations and in defining their relationship with  the State. 
The truth is  that it is  impossible  to  say  that all  national-
ised industries are,  or are not inefficient.  This has been the 
trouble in Britain-the whole argument has been conducted 
in  dogmatic  terms  instead  of trying  to  encourage  what  is 
efficient and discourage what is  not irrespective of whether 
they  are  publicly  owned  or  not.  Thus  Renault,  a  totally 
nationalised  concern,  is  evidently  more  successful  than 
most  British  motor  companies,  while  some  nationalised 
concerns  can  be  shown  to  be  less  successful  than  some 
private ones. 
The following  statistics give  some indication that nation-
alised industries have  not been lagging  behind in attempts 
to increase productivity-rather the contrary. 
Productivity  figures  1958-1968 
I 
Manu-~  I  ~acturing  Railways 
mdustry  I  Electricity I  Country  Airlines  Coal 
Italy  7.8  2.8  10.5  5.1 
Holland  6.8  10.5  4.7 
Germany  5.9  4.7  10.7  7.6  7.1 
Belgium  5.4  4.1  4.2  10.4  5.9 
France  5.2  3.3  7.6  7.3  3.1 
UK  4.0  4.6  9.8  7.7  5.9 
Source:  Richard  Pryke,  University  of Liverpool. 
These  productivity  figures  measure  increases  in  traffic 
per man hour in  railways  (1958  to  1968),  output per man 
hour  in  manufacturing  industry,  increases  in  passenger 
miles  per man  year  with  airlines,  sales  per  man  hour  in 
electricity  and  increases  in  tonnage  per man  hour in  the 
case of coal. 
It can  be  seen  from  this  table  that  British  nationalised 
industries  compare very  favourably  both with  manufactur-
ing industry in  Britain and with public enterprises in  other 
European  countries.  Whereas  manufacturing  industry  in 
Britain (which  is  mainly privately-owned)  is  at the bottom 
of the  table,  public  enterprises  are  near the  top.  This,  at 
least,  should  provide  some  consolation  to  Britain  as  she 
girds  her  loins  to  meet  the  challenge  of  the  Common 
Market. European  studies,  12,  1971. 
Brittany 
New patterns of trade  and production created by the  advent of the  EEC have  undoubt-
edly accentuated the problems of peripheral regions like Brittany. Situated at the "finis-terrae" 
of Europe,  Brittany  has  nevertheless striven  to  transform  its  image  as  an  exporter  of popu-
lation  and as  an  economic  backwater.  The  forces  of regionalism  have  proved strong  in  this 
region  where defence  of a separate  culture has been  reinforced  by real  economic grievances. 
A  vigorous  campaign  from  within  the  region  in  the  immediate  post-war  period  culminated 
in  Brittany  submitting  the  first  regional  development  plan  in  France,  which  was  approved 
by the  government  in  1956. 
The  peninsula  of  Brittany,  formed  by  the  four  depart-
ments  of Finistere,  Morbihan,  Cotes  du  Nord and  Ille-et-
Vilaine (which together comprise the official planning region 
of Bretagne) is  an area with a  distinctive regional identity. 
During the last decade, national and international attention 
has  been increasingly drawn to  this  region by the publicity 
given  to  farmers'  violent  demonstrations.  This  strongly 
expressed  regional  discontent  emphasises  a  feeling  that 
insufficient  has  been  done  by  the  French  Government  to 
tackle  what  has  long  been  evocatively  referred  to  as  the 
mal Breton. 
High  agricultural  dependency  combined  with  retarded 
farm structures are clearly an important part of this  com-
plex  regional  ailment  further  exacerbated  by  a  stagnation 
in  industrial  growth.  The  most  obvious  symptom  of such 
backwardness  is  the  chronic  regional  depopulation 
experienced throughout this century. 
Migration 
There is  nothing new in this exodus of population which 
has  been  likened  to  a  haemorrhage  of  Brittany's  human 
resources.  Since  1851,  the  region  has  lost  over  1.1  million 
people through migration, three-quarters of a million during 
this  century alone. 
The  migration  loss  significantly  under-represents 
the  true  scale  of  regional  depopulation.  Between 
1954-1962,  the  net loss  of 93,000  migrants,  almost half of 
whom  moved  to  the  Paris  region,  resulted  from  202,000 
emigrants and 109,000 immigrants. Of the emigrants, three-
quarters were aged  between  15  and 34  years,  productively 
the  most  important  age  group  of  the  active  population. 
In contrast, the immigrants were  mainly older people,  one 
third aged over  55  years, mostly  Bretons returning to  their 
home  districts  to  retire  after  spending  their  working  lives 
in  other parts  of France. 
Position and regional character 
Largely  because  of  its  peripheral  position,  eccentric  to 
the main stream of France's economic life,  the  region  was 
virtually by-passed by the industrial revolution of the nine-
teenth century. 
Within  the  Breton  peninsula details of the coastline  and 
the broken relief of the interior produce a  number of local 
problems. The numerous rias (drowned river valleys) which 
indent  the  coastline  create  difficulties  of  land  communi-
cation, whilst the east-west orientation of the low plateaux 
or  Iandes  of  the  Armorican  massif  impedes  north-south 
links. 
Overall,  it  is  the  traditional  distinction  made  between 
Armor-land  of  sea  and  Argoad-land  of  woods  which 
offers  a  basic  duality  in  the  geography  of  the  peninsula. 
The  high  population  densities  and  growth  of  the  littoral 
reflect  more  intense  and  varied  activities  based  on 
a  combination  of  resources  not  present  in  the  interior. 
Brittany's climate may generally  be described as  oceanic 
and  is  favourable  to  agriculture  which,  however,  varies 
considerably from mixed farming  and stock  rearing inland 
to  the  intensive  production  of  early  vegetables  and  fruits 
in certain coastal areas (insert 2).  Much of Breton farming 
remains  dependent  on  small-scale  polyculture,  stemming 
from inherited traditions of self-sufficiency, and is ill-adapt-
ed  to  a  modern  agrarian  economy.  While  75  per cent  of 
the land  is  in agricultural  use  compared  with  60  per cent 
in  France as  a  whole,  over  much of the  region  soils  are 
poor,  badly drained and acidic.  Cultivation  requires  inten-
sive care and considerable use of fertilizers  to  achieve good 
results.  The  most  fertile  areas  are  the  coastal  plateau  of 
Leon and  the  Rennes  basin  which  are  covered  with  light 
"limon" soils. 
Raw materials 
Brittany  is  not  well  endowed  in  those  raw  materials 
which  might  have  stimulated  major  industrial  activities. 
(insert 1).  Granite, quarried in the Cotes du Nord and Ille-
et-Vilaine,  accounts  for  some  50  per cent of national pro-
duction  but while  of local  importance as  a  building mate-
rial,  there  are  few  other  commercial  outlets.  The same  is 
true of slate,  for  which  Brittany  contributes  5  per cent of 
national production. 
Kaolin and uranium are resources  of greater signifiance. 
Kaolin,  exploited  mainly  in  the  Finistere  and  Morbihan, 
accounts for over  70  per cent of French production.  Ura-
nium  has  become  of  growing  importance  nationally  as  a 
future alternative source of energy to coal and oil. Follow-
ing  the  creation  of  the  Commissariat  for  Atomic  Energy 
in  1945,  intensive  prospecting  for  uranium has  led  to  the 
discovery  of  exploitable  quantities  in  the  central  Massif, 
TABLE 
Brittany: Population growth  &  migration  1851-1968 
1851-1911  1911-1946  1946-1954  1954-1962  I 
1962-1968 
Brittany 
Per cent population increase  +13.0  -10.0  +  0.8  +  1.5  +3.0 
Average  net  migration  loss 
per  annum  - 8,000  -12.000  -18,000  -11,000  -2,000 
France 
Per cent population increase  +13.5  - 2.4  +  5.6  +  8.1  +7.5 
Source:  INSEE  (lnstitut  National  de  Ia  Statistique  et  des  Etudes Economiques)  1968. 
1 the Vendee and in the Morbihan region.  This latter region 
now  accounts  for  nearly  10  per  cent  of  French  supplies. 
Energy 
An  absence  of indigenous  energy  resources  was  a  con-
tributing factor to the lack of industrial growth in Brittany. 
Not to have coal is  no longer a  serious disadvantage, espe-
cially  since  Brittany  could  obtain  foreign  coal,  in  parti-
cular from America, at prices much lower than French coal: 
not  being  permitted  to  take  advantage  of this  because  of 
protective limits  on coal imports is  a  Breton grievance.  Of 
only  limited  signifiance  is  the  number  of  small  hydro-
electric  power stations.  The resulting  high  cost has  been  a 
major disincentive to industries dependent on large supplies 
of energy. 
A  number of recent changes has occurred in the field  of 
energy  production.  Natural  gas  from  Lacq  now  reaches 
Rennes  and Lorient,  and  together  with  two  new  oil  refin-
eries  at  Donges  and  Rennes,  these  developments  have 
reduced the cost of fuel  in the Rennes  region  by some  15 
per  cent  since  1965.  In  addition,  two  developments  have 
been completed on the Monts d'Aree. In the Rance estuary, 
the power station of the tidal barrage started in 1961  came 
into  production  in  1967,  with  a  capacity  limited  to  550 
million  kWh.  At  Brennilis,  the  nuclear  power  station 
remains experimental reactor of small capacity, built essen-
tially  as  a  prototype.  These  latter  developments  should 
both be regarded as prestige projects rather than as serious 
attempts  to  solve  the  region's  energy  deficiency  problem 
(insert 1). 
Capital 
Shortage  of  investments  within  Brittany  has  further 
discouraged industrial development. Local sources of capital 
are  rare,  principally  because  of  the  absence  of well-estab-
lished  commercial  activities.  At  the  same  time,  outside 
capital is  not attracted to  a  region lacking  the basic infra-
structures necessary for new industry. 
Transport 
Brittany  is  poorly  served  by a  communications  network 
which  affords  little  regional  integration.  (insert  4). 
Rail: 
Two  coastal  east-west  axes,  Rennes-Saint-Brieuc-Brest 
and  Nantes-Lorient-Quimper  dominate  the  network,  with 
the most important north-south link  joining  Saint-Malo  to 
Nantes via Rennes. Electrification has only been completed 
between Paris and  Rennes.  The old metric  gauge  network 
of central  Brittany  remains  largely  disused  although,  as  a 
result of a  campaign by the CELIB 1  in  1962,  the conver-
sion  to  normal  gauge  of  the  single  track  link  between 
Guingamp and Carhaix was  completed by  1966. 
Road: 
The pattern of road transport exhibits similar weaknesses 
to  those of the  rail  network.  Started under  the  Fifth Plan 
(1965-1970),  major  improvements  to  the  two  north  and 
south  coastal  axes  should  complete  their  conversion  to 
four-lane  highways  by  the  end  of  the  Sixth  Plan  (1975). 
Despite pressure from  the CELIB for a  motorway through 
the  problem  region  of  central  Brittany,  the  present  plan 
only  envisages  completing  improvements  to  the  existing 
two-lane  road  link  between  Rennes-Loudeac-Chateaulin. 
The  motorway  from  Paris,  the  autoroute  de  /'Ouest,  is 
to  be extended only as  far as  Le  Mans during the present 
plan period. 
Water: 
Water  transport is  insignificant.  The Ille-et-Rance  canal, 
running  from  Saint-Malo  to  Rennes  and  the  canal  from 
Nantes to Brest carry very small  tonnages  (maximum  size 
I  Comite  d'Etude  et  de  Liaison  des  Interets  Bretons,  a  regional 
action  committee  set  uo  in  1949  to  promote  the  interests  of  Brittany. 
barges  100 tons).  Few improvements are planned and these 
largely  relate  to  developing  the  tourist  potential  of  this 
canal network. 
With  a  long  coastline  adjacent  to  some  of the  busiest 
ocean  shipping  lanes,  it  appears  paradoxical  that  the 
region's  best  communications  potential,  namely  its  mari-
time  links,  remains  virtually  underdeveloped.  Despite  a 
natural  harbour  of  sufficient  depth  to  permit  entry  of 
vessels  of  up  250,000  tons,  Brest  in  1969  handled  only 
1, 145,000  tons  (three-quarters  of  which  in  the  form  of 
imports) and ranks fourteenth in the list of French ports 2. 
Together with  Lorient  (1,210,000  tons  in  1969)  and Saint-
Malo (803,000  tons in  1969)  these  Breton ports  are partic-
ularly  handicapped  by  situation  to  participate  in  the 
growing trade within the EEC. The promise of more effec-
tive land communications within the region has now led to 
major capital  investment  in  the port of Brest  in order  to 
realise  more  fully  its  physical  advantages.  Present  devel-
opments include major extensions  to dry-docking  facilities, 
and  an  oil  terminal  for  super-tankers  linked  to  the  con-
struction of an oil refinery of 4 million ton capacity. 
Air: 
Since  1961  "Air-Inter"  has  established  daily  flights 
between  Paris  and  Rennes,  Dinard,  Saint-Brieuc,  Brest, 
Lorient  and  Quimper  with  additional  services  during  the 
tourist season.  As  yet,  these  developments  have little signi-
ficance  for  the  transport  of  freight. 
Level  of living 
This  weakness  in  economic  activity  within  Brittany  has 
led  inevitably  to  limiting  investment  in  the  regional  infra-
structure, not only in housing and services but also in such 
fields  as  education.  The  resultant  lower  material  standard 
of living  is  as  much  a  reason  for  the departure of young 
emigrants  as  is  the  lack of good employment prospects. 
Various indices demonstrate the extent of this  socio-eco-
nomic  disparity:  in  1962,  salaried  income  per  household 
was  some  30  per  cent  lower  than  the  national  average; 
in  1963,  domestic  electricity  consumption  was  37  per cent 
lower and in  1964  telephone  usage  50  per cent  lower  per 
head of population than for France. 
Housing  is  a  national  problem,  but  the  situation  in 
Brittany remains by far the worst for any region in France. 
rn  rural  communes,  which  in  1962  accounted  for  60  per 
cent  of  the  region's  housing,  the  problem  is  accentuated 
by a  highly dispersed habitat with over one third of dwell-
ings  isolated.  Added to  the  acute problems of over-crowd-
ing,  the extreme age of much rural housing largely explains 
the  low  level  of  provision  in  essential  domestic  services: 
in  1966,  mains  water  supply still  only affected  48  per cent 
of rural  housing  in  Brittany,  compared  with  68  per  cent 
for France. 
Regional  development plan 
In the immediate post-war period, it was quickly realised 
that  only  a  complete  programme  of  regional  renovation 
could  effectively  reverse  this  century-old  regression.  To-
wards  this  end,  regional  initiative  and  participation  have 
provided  the  primary  stimulus  in  tackling  the  task  of 
reviving the economy. 
Between  1949-1951  the  CELIB,  comprising  represent-
atives  from commerce and industry,  universities,  local  and 
national government, became fully established as a regional 
action  committee.  Following  governmental  recognition  in 
1955  as  a  regional  expansion  committee,  the  CELIB  was 
instrumental  in  Brittany  being  the  first  French  region  to 
produce a  regional  development plan in  1956. 
Short term  objectives  like  restoring  a  measure  of demo-
graphic  balance,  and the long  term  objectives  of bringing 
2  France's  leading  ports,  Marseille  and  Le  Havre  respectively  with 
tonnages  of  65  million  and  50  million  handled  in  1969. 0 
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100 about  an  effective  redistribution  of  population  and  eco-
nomic activities  throughout the region  depend on a  future 
development  which  must  strike  a  new  balance  between 
agriculture and industry. 
Agriculture 
In 1962,  42  per cent of the region's total employed pop-
ulation was engaged in agriculture. By 1968, this proportion 
had been  reduced to  33  per cent and for  the first  time  in 
the region's evolution agriculture no longer .represented the 
dominant sector 3. By  1985, the present agncultural labour 
force  of  under  300,000  will  be  further  reduced  by  half. 
The  establishment  of  EEC  agricultural  policies  has  pro-
voked  a  period  of  profound  structural  transformation  in 
French agriculture,  which  in tum is  forcing  long  over-due 
changes in the out-dated structure of Breton farming. 
Despite  this  backwardness,  Brittany  today  ranks  as  an 
important agricultural producing area. With  ju~t over 6 per 
cent of the agricultural area of France, the region accounts 
for  between 9-10  per cent of national  production 4.  How-
ever  although in terms of total production the region ranks 
high,  the  value  of per  capita  production  lies  well  below 
the national average (insert 2). 
The Breton plan strongly advocates further specialisation 
towards  livestock  production.  Even  so,  the  spectacular 
growth in recent years  of pork,  dairy and poultry produc-
tion  has  not  been  without  its  own  problems.  The  devel-
opment  of specialised  pig  and  poultry  farms,  agricultural 
practices which appeared well  suited to the small  farms  of 
central  Brittany,  has  not been  accompanied  by  the neces-
sary control measures required to avoid a constant  .tenden~y 
to  over  production.  The  growth  of  factory-farrmng  umts 
owned  by such  large firms  as  Unilever  has  brought other 
difficulties.  Farmers  now  find  themselves  under  contract 
for their produce, but vigorous competition between  vario~s 
commercial interests can bring price fluctuations often detri-
mental  to  the  small  producer.  Finally,  competition  from 
other  areas  within  the  EEC,  especially  from  the  Nether-
lands, has deprived  Brittany of its share in the most profi-
table market, West Germany. Recurrent crises have brought 
a  significant  contraction  in  poultry  production  since  1963. 
Similarly,  the  recently  much  publicised  problems  of 
vegetable production, already susceptible to variable weath-
er conditions,  have been aggravated  by market fluctuations 
in prices as well as difficulties of distribution. Some markets 
have been almost wholly lost (as with garden peas formerly 
important in Sud-Finistere) through competition from better 
located,  larger scale producers in the northern Paris basin. 
Hence the growing  importance of various  regional  cooper-
atives  and  societies  which  have  become  specifically  con-
cerned  with  the  commercialisation  of  particular  produce. 
Against  this  background,  the  rapid  growth  during  the 
last decade of new  agricultural and  food  processing  indus-
tries  shows  that the problems of geographical  distance can 
in some considerable measure be overcome  by such devel-
opments  within  the  region.  The  most  striking  example  is 
the  dairy  industry,  transformed  from  a  traditional  system 
based  on collection  of farm  butter and supply of milk  to 
nearby towns  into  a  modern industry dominated  by a  few 
large  group  monopolies  (including  SAPIEM,  the  second 
largest  industrial dairy group in France). 
Increased  agricultural  productivity  and  competitiveness 
must also  be  based  on modem agrarian forms which facil-
itate  technical  progress.  Over  half  the  farms  of  Brittany 
are  less  than  10  hectares  (25  acres)  in  size,  with  farms 
over  50  hectares  (125  acres)  practically  non-existent  The 
small  average  size  of  holdings  is  further  aggravated  by 
excessive  subdivision  into  widely  scattered  small  plots, 
which in the  Pays  de  Redon,  for  instance,  has  resulted  in 
s  34  per  cent  in  primary  sector,  27  per  cent  in  secondary  sector, 
38  per  cent  in  tertiary  sector.  France  with  respectively  15  per  cent, 
40  per  cent  and  45  per  cent. 
4  Wheat  7  per  cent;  beef  10  per  cent;  milk  12  per  cent;  pork  19 
per  cent;  poultry 25  per cent;  eggs  25  per cent;  potatoes  27  per cent; 
cauliflowers/artichokes  50  per  cent. 
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holdings of 6 hectares divided into 25  dispersed plots, many 
measuring  only  1.50  to  2.50  metres  across! 
Rationalisation  of  such  fragmented  structures  is  inevi-
tably a slow process; 75  per cent of the region's agricultural 
area  in  need  of "remembrement"  still  remains  untouched, 
which in itself suggests  a  15-20  year programme. The main 
obstacle  to  more  rapid  progress  is  essentially  technical, 
relating  to  the  high  cost of eliminating  hedge  banks  (esti-
mated to account for 10 per cent of the region's agricultural 
area),  redirection  of  surface  drainage  and  reorganisation 
of farm access roads. 
To  the  special  problem  of farm  consolidation  must  be 
added those of creating larger more viable units. Following 
the  1960  Act Loi d'Orientation  Agricole, a  regional  agency 
was created representing another development in the enlarg-
ement and restructuring of farm units. The degree of inter-
vention  possible  by  this  agency  in  buying  up  land  for 
redistribution  varies  regionally.  In  Ille-et-Vilaine,  where 
66  per cent  of farmers  are  tenants,  very  little  land comes 
on to  the market in  face  of a  constantly  high  demand  to 
rent small  holdings.  By  contrast,  in  parts  of central  Brit-
tany, abandoned farms are being passed into a "land bank" 
as  part of a  long-term  re-zoning  of agricultural  potential, 
reserving  particular areas  for  extensive  re-afforestation.  To 
date,  however,  the  operations  of the  agency  have  affected 
barely  10  per cent of the  region's  agricultural  area. 
A  second  Act  in  1962  created  a  social  fund  likely  to 
prove  crucial  to  more  rapid  progress  in  structural  reno-
vation.  It provides  additional  pensions  to  elderly  farmers 
wishing to retire, grants and loans for improvement of farm 
equipment and financial aid to young agriculturalists opting 
for  vocational  retraining  towards  alternative  employment. 
As  yet only modest results have been achieved by this new 
policy. 
Given the small and fragmented nature of farm holdings, 
much of the mechanised equipment-particularly tractors-
remains  effectively  under-used. 
Again, over the last ten years,  Brittany has  seen  remark-
able  growth  in  the  activities  of  two  organisations  which 
exist  to  encourage  farmers  to  work  together  to  improve 
efficiency.  Over  1,000  collective  machinery  organisations 
facilitate the widespread use of heavy farm equipment, and 
a further 100 centres for the study of agricultural techniques 
diffuse  modem ideas  to  farming  communities. 
Fishing 
In  1970  the  Breton  fishing  industry  employed  a  land 
work-force  of about 30,000  in  addition  to  15,000  sea  fish-
ermen. Brittany is the most important fish  producing region 
in  France,  providing  some  45  per  cent  of  the  national 
supply  of fresh  fish,  70  per cent  of shell-fish  and  60  per 
cent of oysters. Today, however,  the region's fishing  indus-
try faces  several difficulties.  In particular, the exhaustion of 
traditional  coastal  fishing  grounds  along  the  continental 
shelf  means  new  capital  investment  and modernisation  of 
the :fleet for deep sea fishing.  At the same time, the fluctuat-
ing  market  has  been  especially  affected  by  the  relative 
stagnation  of  French  fish  consumption.  Since  1964,  two 
newly  created  regional  organisations,  one  concerned  with 
financial  aid and the other with  the  problem  of surpluses, 
have  sought  to  rationalise  the  industry,  which  more  and 
more  is  to  be  concentrated  in  the  large  ports  of Lorient, 
Concameau and Douamenez. 
Industry 
The  observed  amelioration  in  the  region's  demographic 
situation has been attributed to the effect of new industrial 
growth.  However,  the  regional  impact  of  this  improved 
trend  largely  affects  only  one  department,  Ille-et-Vilaine, 
focusing  almost wholly  on Brittany's major growth  centre, 
Rennes  (an  agglomeration  of  almost  250,000  popula-
tion).  Of  over  35,000  new  jobs  created  in  industry between  1954-1967,  39  per  cent  were  located  at  Rennes 
(followed  by Brest with  7  per cent).  The concentration  of 
new economic activities  in a  few  established growth points 
appears  inevitable  in  a  region  where  both  the  social  and 
economic  infrastructure  remains  ill-adapted  to  promoting 
balanced  regional  development. 
Between  1962-1968,  the  employed  population  of  Ille-et-
Vilaine increased by  5.4 per cent while  that of each of the 
other  three  Breton  departments  decreased  by  1  to  2  per 
cent.  Brittany  as  a  whole thus  showed  a  minimal increase 
of  only  0.2  per  cent  which  remained  in  marked  contrast 
to  the  growth  of  5  per  cent  achieved  nationally  between 
1962-1968. 
With  only  27.3  per  cent  of  the  region's  working  pop-
ulation  in  the  secondary  sector  (France  39.6  per  cent) 
Brittany remains under-industrialised (Table 2).  Much more 
significant  is  the  lack  of  a  strongly  diversified  industrial 
structure  with  growth  potential.  Construction  and  public 
works,  which  has  experienced  an  exceptional  rate  of 
growth since the war employs over 40  per cent of the total 
workforce  in  this  sector.  This  represents  almost  twice  the 
percentage employed nationally. 
Mechanical  and electrical  engineering  industries received 
a  considerable  boost with the establishment and continued 
expansion  of  the  two  Citroen  car-works  decentralised  to 
Rennes  in  1959  and  1961.  Together these  assembly  plants 
now  employ  over  10,000  workers,  and  their  location  has 
considerably  benefitted  the  impoverished  rural  interior  to 
the  south-west of Rennes,  where most of the labour force 
which commutes in daily has been recruited. Heavy indus-
try  is  virtually  non-existent  in  Brittany.  In  1968  Renault 
sited a  car component plant at Lorient while  the Michelin 
plant  at  Vannes  has  doubled  its  workforce  to  over  1,500 
since first opened in 1963. 
Renewed growth of traditional food processing industries 
has  brought  much  needed  employment  to  several  small 
towns.  Fish  and  vegetable  canning  is  concentrated  on the 
south coast while  in the interior a  number of large  dairy 
cooperatives  have  been  established.  Thus  the  industrial 
renaissance  of Loudeac-once the  centre  of  an  important 
rural linen industry-has been achieved by exploiting  both 
the  local  agricultural  resource  base  and  its  strategic 
TABLE  2 
Brittany:  occupational  structure,  1968 
Branch  I Total  I To"l  Per  cent 
of  economic  employed  change  change 
activity  1968  1962-1968  1962-1968 
I.  Fishing  15,000  - 1,900  -11 
Agriculture and For-
estry  326,900  -95,300  -23 
Extractive  industries  5,500  200  - 4 
II. Construction and 
public  works  113,600  +27,800  +32 
Manufacturing  indu-
stries a  152,100  +22,700  +17 
III.  Transport  37,400  +  1,100  +  3 
Commerce,  banking 
insurance  138,600  + 15,400  +13 
Services  98,000  + 13,500  +16 
Public  Administra-
tion,  Armed  For-
ces  105,000  + 18,400  +21 
Total  1992,200  +  1,500  +  0.2 
Major  sectors:  !-primary,  11-secondary,  III-tertiary. 
a  Largest  increases  in  employment  between  1962-1968  were  among 
the  following  industries:  food:  10  per  cent;  automobile:  73 per  cent; 
electrical  and  electronic:  515  per  cent;  mechanical  engineering:  55  per 
cent;  construction  materials:  27  per  cent;  chemical  and  rubber: 
97  per  cent;  clothing:  17  per  cent. 
Source  :  INSEE  (Institut  National  de  Ia  Statistique  et  des  Etudes 
Economiques)  1968. 
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geographical  position.  Several  new  processing  industries, 
but particularly Olida (pork products) employing 500 work-
ers and opened in 1965,  have helped to  stabilise population 
trends  and make Loudeac  (8,000  population)  a  model  for 
future growth in  central  Brittany. 
The  over-riding  feature  of  Breton  industry  is  the  small 
scale of firms.  Of 36,000  industrial firms  listed in 1966,  less 
than 1 per cent employed more than 100  workers and only 
11  establishments  employed more than  1  ,000.  Most of the 
traditional  clothing  and  leather  industries,  providing 
welcome  job  opportunities  for  female  labour,  have  exper-
ienced  recurrent problems  because  of small  size.  Fougeres 
remains  an  important  centre  for  these  latter  industries, 
now undergoing reorganisation as in the replacement of the 
older textile  industry by the manufacture of ready-to-wear 
garments. 
Since  1960,  government  policy  has  striven  to  achieve 
a  more  vigorous  renewal  of  industrial  decentralisation 
(insert 5) into the Breton peninsula beyond Rennes.  In view 
of  transport  and  other  economic  costs,  the  emphasis  has 
been  on  light  industries,  particularly  science-based  indus-
tries enjoying links with three newly decentralised advanced 
research institutes at the University of Rennes. Thus in the 
field  of electronics centres  were located at  Lannion,  Brest, 
Saint-Malo, Fougeres and more recently CELAR, Fairchild 
and Thomson-Houston in  Rennes.  However,  between  1960 
and  1970  this  produced only  4,000  new  jobs  (2.5  per cent 
of the national work-force in electronics).  Although in  the 
long term such advanced technology industries are theoreti-
cally capable of exercising  a  regional multiplier effect,  the 
CELIB  sees  an  urgent  need  to  widen  and  diversify  Brit-
tany's  industrial  structure  even  further  by  creating  large 
scale  industrial  port complexes.  The  new  developments  at 
Brest  represent a  move in this  direction. 
Tourism 
Just  over  two  million  tourists  spend  altogether  about 
70  million  days  holiday  in  Brittany  each  year,  accounting 
for  10  per  cent  of  the  French  total.  This  tourist  activity 
yields  over 5 per cent of the region's revenue.  In  order to 
expand the important complementary role of tourism, much 
more  investment  is  needed  to  improve  facilities,  partic-
ularly  in  appropriate  hotel  accommodation  and  camping 
sites. 
Future  prospects 
Through their determined attempt to  revive  the region's 
economy,  Breton  initiatives  have  pioneered  the  devel-
opment of French regional planning in the post-war period. 
In  particular,  the  prolonged  campaign  by  the  CELIB  is 
beginning,  albeit  slowly,  to see  the first  fruits  of progress. 
According  to  the  newly  published  white  paper  (1971)  of 
the CELIB, the current period of the Sixth Plan will remain 
one of transition, with objectives firmly  fixed on continuing 
the  renovation  of  the  region's  infrastructure  in  order  to 
accelerate  industrial  growth.  Most  of  the  special  regional 
budget  made  available  is  being  devoted  to  the  communi-
cations  network,  which,  in  view  of  Brittany's  relative 
geographical isolation  can be considered  a  crucial  catalyst 
of future development. 
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•  1n  Europe (II)  The  urban  phenomenon 
This article  by Prof.  T.  H.  Elkins of Sussex  University  is  the  continuation of the 
first  article  on  the  same subject  published  in  No.  10  of the  Teachers'  Series.  It is  a 
general  presentation  of city  structure  and city  planning  in  some  European  countries. 
It describes  the problems arising  from  the  creation  of new  peripheral  housing  estates 
as  well  as  new  towns  and  the  solutions  proposed  for  the  improvement of this  new 
way  of life. 
City structure 
The  modern  city  is  characteristically  divided  into 
specialised use zones. In the western world, the process 
producing  such a  zonation is  primarily  economic:  big 
stores  will  outbid other  claimants for  sites  on central 
shopping  streets,  offices  will  outbid  housing  for  sites 
in the central business district, the wealthy will  outbid 
poorer  people  for  the  most  highly  valued  residential 
sites.  Nevertheless,  although  the process  is  everywhere 
similar,  the  objectives  of  the  bidders  do  reflect  some 
marked differences  of values  from country to country. 
The central area 
The most universal of these specialised areas is found 
at the heart of the city. Commonly in central and west-
ern Europe  the  central  area  coincides  in  extent  with 
the  city  as  it  was  before  the  age  of  industry,  the 
Innenstadt, and is  often still defined by the boulevards 
that have replaced the former walls.  Into this area will 
have been concentrated the central activities  and insti-
tutions  of the city,  of its  region  or of even  a  nation, 
with consequent driving out of the original residents. 
Commonly,  the  central  area  is  itself  divided  into  a 
number of distinct use zones.  The most familiar is  the 
central business  district,  marked  all too  frequently  by 
the  replacement  of  historic  quarters  by  characterless 
office  blocks,  dwarfing the churches and other historic 
buildings that recall  an earlier community life.  A  sec-
ond distinctive use is  retailing, perhaps combined with 
entertainment.  In some cities  there may also  be a  dis-
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tinct  cultural  quarter,  with  university  institutes  and 
publishing  houses,  like  the  Quartier  Latin  in  Paris. 
Finally  great capital cities  have  a  distinct government 
quarter, a  Whitehall or Wilhelmstrasse. 
As  a  result  of  this  specialisation  the  central  area 
becomes  a  place  where  people  work,  especially  in the 
rapidly  expanding  tertiary sector  of the  economy,  but 
do not live.  Central London, for example, employs  1.3 
million workers,  but only 8 per cent of them are resi-
dent. The overwhelming majority must journey to their 
work from the outer parts of the city and even beyond 
it. The consequence for city planning of movements on 
this  scale  can  be  easily  imagined.  Yet  the  process 
of  excluding  the  residential  population  is  not  every-
where  as  complete  as  in  London  or  as  in  many 
German cities,  where  wartime  destruction  accentuated 
the movement.  In particular the people of France and 
the Mediterranean countries cling to residences in their 
central  cities.  Consequently  central  Paris  in  1965  still 
averaged  351  inhabitants  to  the  square  kilometer,  as 
against 139  in Stockholm or 100 in London. 
The middle zone 
The central  area  is  characteristically  surrounded  by 
a  belt of high-density  housing,  mostly  the  product  of 
the  19th  and  early  20th  centuries.  In  the  continental 
city one part of this belt will consist of middle or upper-
class housing, which is  often attracted by such  fe~tures 
as  parks, royal palaces or rivers,  and avoids  the prox-
imity of industry and railways. 
So in  Paris we  find  the  fashionable  districts  around 
the Louvre continued westwards into the 16th arrondis-sement beyond the Etoile, in Berlin the embassy quarter 
south of the Tiergarten, continuing into Charlottenburg, 
in  Brussels  the  quarter around  the  Royal  Palace  and 
(more  exceptionally  in  England)  Mayfair  and  Ken-
sington  in London. 
In recent  years  these  "good class"  districts  fringing 
the central area tend to be taken over for professional 
purposes (lawyers, doctors) or for offices;  currently, for 
example, there is  a great controversy over the invasion 
of the formerly exclusive Frankfurt "West End" district 
by giant offices  blocks. 
Over most of the middle zone working-class housing 
predominates;  Mietskasernen  (rent-barracks)  of Berlin 
and  other  German  cities  on  their  precise  rectangular 
grid  of streets,  or  the  irregular  narrow  streets  of the 
outer  rarts  of  the  city  of  Paris,  stretching  from  the 
railway stations to the nineteenth-century city limits on 
what  is  now  the  boulevard  peripherique.  Typical  of 
the zone  is  a  large  intermixture  of industry:  medium-
sized  plants  on  the  radiating  railways  and waterways, 
but more  especially  hundreds  of small  industries  and 
independent  craftsmen  in  courtyards  and  all  sorts  of 
improvised  and  unsuitable  premises.  Parks  and  open 
spaces are rare. 
The suburbs 
We  think of the suburbs as  the abode of the middle 
classes,  and this  is  broadly  true  in  Britain,  Germany, 
Scan  dina  via  and  the  Netherlands,  where  the  middle 
classes  have  long  used  their  mobility  and  purchasing 
power to obtain a little more space and fresh air than 
is  available  in  the  central  city.  They  have  however 
been followed  in this  movement by at least the finan-
cially more stable members of the working class.  What 
is characteristic of the suburb is  segregation: the middle 
classes  tend  to pick the more pleasant neighbourhoods 
near rivers, parks or forests, leaving the working classes 
to occupy the gaps  between.  So  we  have  the develop-
ment  of  preferred  middle-class  suburbs:  Steglitz  in 
Berlin, the banks of the Alster and Blankense in Ham-
burg,  the neighbourhoods of the  parks of Saint-Cloud 
and Sceaux in  greater Paris. 
We  must  however  beware  of  applying  the  Anglo-
Saxon  model  to  the  French  or  Mediterranean  city. 
Saint-Cloud and Sceaux are very much exceptions; the 
prestige  residential  area  of  greater  Paris  is  not  the 
suburbs  but  the  16th  arrondissement  of  the  "middle 
zone". It is  the working classes  who  are forced  out to 
the  suburbs,  which  are  not  the  orderly  Anglo-Saxon 
affairs  of  roses  and  trim  lawns  but  crowded  and 
unplanned  accumulations  of  often  sub-standard  indi-
vidual houses, what the French call pavilions. Typically 
such suburbs are poorly provided with public utilities, 
schools, hospitals and administrative services generally. 
Much the same is  true of Rome, where new working-
class  settlers  are  relegated  to  the  borgate,  unplanned 
peripheral  settlements  of  rudimentary  dwellings.  The 
most  recent  immigrants  of  all  may  find  themselves 
driven even lower down the scale to the shanty towns, 
the  bidonvilles,  squatting  on  the  waste  lands  in  the 
interstices of the developing agglomeration. 
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The mral fringe 
Beyond  the  continuously  built-up  fringe  of  the 
agglomeration  lie  the  commuter  towns  and  villages. 
In Britain it is mostly the middle classes who move out 
to  colonise  the  villages  and  farms  abandoned  by  a 
declining  rural  population.  In  continental  countries 
the  long-distance  commuters  are  characteristically 
recruited from the indigenous rural population, workers 
who have  abandoned  farming but not their rural res-
idence. 
Restructuring  the city 
Urban renewal 
What is being done to  make the great European city 
a fit place to live in for its inhabitants? Most obviously 
in need  of attention is  the middle  zone,  with  its  mass 
of  poor-quality  working-class  housing,  together  with 
any similar sections in the historic core that have not 
been  taken  over  for  typical  central-area  activities. 
Administratively, technically  and financially  the  easiest 
solution  is  usually  to  clear  away  the  sub-standard 
accommodations  and  rebuild,  as  in  the  British  slum-
clearance schemes.  The city of Paris, for example,  has 
an interesting plan for  surrounding its historic  central 
area with about a dozen new commercial centres, inject-
ing a  new level of activity into  the run-down  quarters 
of the middle zone. Perhaps the most dramatic of these 
is  the Fronts-de-Seine development, where a  cluster of 
residential and office towers is transforming a run-down 
industrial  quarter  which  has  the  good  fortune  to  be 
just across  the  river  from  the  fashionable  16th  arron-
dissement. 
The  disadvantage  of  the  method  of clearance  and 
rebuilding is  that the costs of the operation are so high 
that if left to the private developer none but the middle 
classes can afford the accommodation provided. It has 
been said  of Rome that the clearance of the crowded 
central  districts  inevitably  involves  the  introduction 
of  middle-class  residents,  and  the  departure  of  the 
former  working-class  residents  to  the  city  fringes.  In 
Paris too, it has been  found  that in  order to  pay for 
the  high  costs  of clearance,  of  the  provision  of new 
motor  roads,  metro  stations,  traffic-free  pedestrian 
shopping centres,  open spaces and all the other desira-
ble  facilities  of  the  new  sectors  of redevelopment,  it 
is necessary to concentrate mainly on office  blocks and 
high-cost  fiats.  As  the  middle  zone  is  redeveloped  in 
this way, it becomes more and more middle-class social-
ly,  with  the  working  classes  displaced  either  into  the 
remaining  areas  of run-down  property,  or out  to  the 
agglomeration fringe. 
Where,  as  with  slum-clearance schemes  in England, 
the  areas  are  used  for  working-class  housing,  social 
problems are not at an end. Long-continued, working-
class occupation of the middle zone has built up strong 
community  structures,  in  part in  reaction  against  the 
very inadequacy of the environment. Social life centres 0 
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0  km particularly  on  the  streets,  the  numerous  small  shops 
and  the  cafes.  When  such  areas  are  cleared  and  the 
populations  dispersed  to  peripheral  housing  projects, 
these  social  groups  are  destroyed.  Another  problem 
is that not everybody feels able to meet the higher rents 
of the new accommodation,  even  though the facilities 
offered may be  greatly superior. 
One  alternative  to  complete  clearance  is  the  reno-
vation  of  existing  housing  rather  than  destruction. 
There  are  interesting  experiments  with  the  Berlin 
Mietskasernen,  which  are  "cored"  by  removing  the 
buildings from around the central courts to let in light 
and air, while the surviving apartments are renovated. 
However  the  process  is  an  expensive  one;  a  host  of 
owners and tenants must be dealt with, and in the end 
between  a  third  and  a  half  of  the  inhabitants  must 
be  resettled  anyway,  because  there  is  not  room  for 
everybody at the new  higher  standard of accommoda-
tion. Renovation rather than destruction is particularly 
to be recommended where attractive historical property 
is  concerned, as  in the  Marais district of central Paris 
where 17th-century hotels had degenerated into warrens 
of  cheap  apartments  and  workshops.  Unfortunately 
such  renovation  is  usually  done  as  a  private  venture, 
and only  the  middle  classes  can  afford  the  inevitably 
high cost of the delicate  building  operations  involved. 
The working classes  must join the trek to the suburbs, 
the  craftsmen  perhaps  put up  their  shutters  for  ever. 
In contrast to the middle zone, the suburbs of Anglo-
Saxon type scarcely  require redevelopment,  since  their 
generally  affluent  populations  have  naturally  attracted 
an  adequate  range  of  social  equipment  and  services. 
The  unplanned  and  mainly  working-class  suburbs  of 
France and the Mediterranean lands, by contrast, require 
restructuring  by  the  insertion  of new  commercial and 
administrative  centres.  Once  again  Paris  provides 
instructive  examples,  notably  the  dramatic  multi-level 
La Defense project, situated in the suburban Hauts-de-
Seine department, but on the axis  of expansion of the 
central  business  district  westwards  from  the  Etoile. 
As  is  common  in  these  Paris  suburban  schemes,  the 
opportunity has been taken to link the new centre with 
the  prefecture  of  the  new  Hauts-de-Seine  department 
in adjoining Nanterre, and with one of the most noto-
rious of the new Paris universities, thus providing social 
and occupational diversity. 
Peripheral  housing  estates 
Even  with  the most careful urban renewal  schemes, 
a  proportion of the population is  always  displaced,  to 
join  with  the  newly  married  and  the  immigrants  of 
the  rapidly  growing  cities  in  a  search  for  accommo-
dation. 
Many of these  people  must receive  some  degree  of 
assistance  from  the  state  or  the  municipality  if  they 
are to be able to obtain reasonable accommodation at 
a  price  they  can  afford.  Accordingly,  most  European 
cities have since the war developed great housing proj-
ects  in  and  beyond  the  suburban  zone.  Usually  such 
schemes  involve  some  measure  of the  state or munic-
ipal subsidy.  West Berlin,  for example, while  restoring 
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its  older  housing  has  also  had  to  create  virtual  new 
towns  for  50,000  people  each.  Although  distinguished 
by  a  lively  architecture,  they  have  been  criticised  as 
heartless,  lacking  the  warmth  and  community  feeling 
of the older districts, but such comments are relatively 
mild  compared  with  the  controversy  that has  ranged 
around the French version on the same theme. France, 
having had a stationary population for 50 years, found 
itself  after  1945  with  one  that  was  rising  steadily,  as 
well  as  undergoing  a  process  of  rapid  urbanization. 
Only a  building programme making use  of large-scale 
mechanised methods could, it seemed, make any impact 
on  the  problem.  The  result  was  the  grand  ensemble, 
the giant housing projects  of up to 50,000  inhabitants 
built on the fringe  of the city.  The earliest plans were 
admittedly highly  uninspiring,  with  rigidly  rectangular 
alignments of identical apartment blocks. Sarcelles, one 
of the earliest grands ensembles, situated on the north-
ern fringe  of Paris,  rapidly  acquired  a  national  repu-
tation  for  its  real  or  alleged  deficiencies,  and  was 
denounced as cold, impersonal, unfriendly and inhuman 
in scale.  There was  no  nearby  employment,  the  men 
were  faced  with  a  long  daily  journey  to  work,  the 
women  left  behind  in  their  bright  new  flats  rapidly 
began  to  suffer  from  'suburban  neurosis'.  There  was 
nothing  to  occupy  the  adolescents,  who  formed  gangs 
and got into trouble with  the police.  Communal facil-
ities  of all  kinds  arrived  long  after the population  to 
be  served:  schools,  municipal  offices,  shops,  clinics, 
sports  grounds  long  remained  inadequate.  A  giant 
shopping centre and an industrial estate are only now 
being created. Certainly not all the mistakes of Sarcelles 
have  been  repeated  in  later  schemes,  but  the  social 
difficulties  of  large  peripheral  housing  schemes  have 
been made clear enough. 
The new towns 
The British contribution to this  problem of housing 
the expanding city population has been the "new town", 
introduced in Sir  Patrick Abercrombie's  Greater Lon-
don  Plan  of  1944.  Their  parentage  dates  back  to 
Ebenezer  Howard  and  the  pioneer  garden  cities  of 
Letchworth  and  Welwyn.  Abercrombie's  idea  was  to 
limit  population  expansion  by  restricting  industrial 
development,  and  then  to  contain  the  existing city  in 
a  green  belt  where  no  building  would  be  permitted, 
while  moving  people  to  be  rehoused  out  to  planned 
new  towns,  of up  to  60,000  inhabitants.  These  would 
be  self  -contained  settlements  with  their  own  industry 
and commercial facilities.  The precise British model of 
rather  small  new  towns  beyond  a  green  belt  has  not 
been much followed  on the  continent. The new  towns 
proposed adjacent to Rouen, Lyon and Lille are broad-
ly  similar  but rather larger-about 150,000  population 
-and closer to the parent city. Germany scarcely needs 
to  make new  towns,  since  history has left the country 
so  well  provided  with  old  ones  waiting  for  develop-
ment.  Copenhagen  and  Stockholm  have  preferred  to 
build chains of satellites  on "fingers"  of new develop-
ment  reaching  out  from  the  parent  city,  and  linked 
to the parent city  by rapid transport systems. 
Even in Britain,  the original new town idea fell  out 
of favour, for a variety of reasons. However successful in themselves,  they  were  obviously  inadequate to deal 
with the rapid population expansion spilling over from 
the central city,  and they were felt  to be too small  to 
obtain  any  genuine  degree  of independent  life.  From 
1964  the idea developed of new cities  rather than new 
towns,  Milton Keynes and a Solent city, placed on the 
very edge  of the southeast region,  in order to achieve 
genuine  independence  and  act  as  counter-magnets  to 
the  social  and  economic  pull  of  London.  The  Paris 
Schema directeur of 1965  also proposed very large new 
towns;  the  four  so  far  planned  in  any  detail  range 
from  300,000  - 500,000  each.  Only  units  of this  size, 
their  planners  felt,  could  offer  a  sufficient  range  of 
economic  and  social  provision  to  their  inhabitants. 
Nevertheless complete independence of the facilities  of 
central Paris was held to be neither likely nor desirable, 
so that the new units are close in to the existing agglom-
eration. Curiously this model has been taken up in the 
latest of the London proposals, the  1970  "Strategy for 
the South East", which proposes that one of the largest 
blocks of future expansion should go  into south Essex, 
adjacent  to  the  existing  London  agglomeration.  The 
reason for this reversal of previous ideas appears to be 
largely social,  springing from the growing appreciation 
that the new towns with their highly skilled and enter-
prising  populations  were  not  alleviating  the  lot  of  a 
great  mass  of  lower-paid  urban  wori<.ers,  who  were 
left behind in their decaying city,  but might,  however, 
manage  the  shorter move into Essex. 
Transport and  the great cities 
The biggest influence on thinking about the form of 
cities  and  the  regions  that surround  them  is  however 
the  needs  of  transport,  particularly  the  motor  car. 
The scale  of mobility  of present-day  people  demands 
a  new type of city.  With the old city centres,  perhaps, 
not a  great deal  can  be  done.  Fortunately,  the  great 
bulk  of  commuter  movement  takes  place  by  public 
transport,  particularly  the  suburban  railway  network. 
Of  the  825,000  persons  travelling  to  work  in  Paris 
daily,  mercifully  only  92,000  do  so  by  car.  However, 
when  added  to  the  910,000  vehicles  registered  in  the 
city  of Paris itself  and  all  the  business  traffic,  a  for-
midable  problem  of  congestion  results.  Recently  an 
air  survey  was  made  of  Paris  traffic.  Only  60,000 
vehicles were on the move, impeded by 340,000 vehicles 
parked  on  the  roads.  A  further  440,000  were  parked 
off  the roads (many of these were  no doubt impeding 
the  pedestrians  on  the  pavements).  The  sheer  lack  of 
amenity  in  all  this  is  familiar  to  every  city  dweller. 
The cure, in terms of urban motorways, may be worse 
than the disease. If the urban motorways follow  exist-
ing open spaces,  then all  too scarce amenities  are lost, 
as with the motorway that follows the north-bank quais 
of the  Seine,  polluting  the  river  scene  with  its  noise. 
4 
If on the other hand it is  taken through built-up areas, 
then  thousands  must  lose  their  homes  to  make  way 
for it,  communities are sundered, and the unfortunate 
remaining  residents  must be  battered by the  noise  of 
traffic,  perhaps  thundering  round  an  elevated  inter-
change within yards of their windows. The controversy 
over  the  London  motorway  "box"  will  be  familiar 
to many. 
At  the  expanding  fringe  of  the  agglomeration,  the 
story  is  quite  different.  Here  new  urban  development 
can  be  planned  with  rapid  transport in  mind,  as  the 
Scandinavians  showed  with  their  finger  plans.  In  the 
typical  city,  transport lines  follow  the  radials.  As  the 
radials  converge  on  the  historic  centre,  so  congestion 
increases.  Recent  thought  on  metropolitan  forms  is 
tending  to  look  for  plans  which  do  not  involve  this 
strongly  convergent  movement.  Forms  with  linear  or 
grid highway systems and strongly separated "cells" of 
urban development have been urged by urban theorists. 
Some  of the  great European  metropolises  have  ac-
quired this looser,  more cellular pattern through  their 
historical  process  of development.  The  Randstad,  the 
horseshoe of towns that encloses the green heart of the 
western Netherlands functions in many ways as a single 
city  of 5  million  inhabitants,  but with  its  constituent 
towns such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague 
playing  distinct  specialised  roles.  Laced  together  by 
electric  railways  and  motorways,  it  is  not  unlike  the 
ring-shaped  city  that  some  of  our  planning  theorists 
would  advocate.  The  same  is  true  of  the  Ruhr 
conurbation,  where  the  multiple  urban  nuclei  charac-
teristic of coalfields are separated by green, or at least 
open, corridors, through which its planners are thread-
ing modern motorways. The result is in some ways not 
unlike  Professor  Buchanan's  plan  for  a  new  Solent 
city,  based  on  a  strongly  rectangular  grid  of  motor 
ways.  In Paris, a  strongly centralised city,  the planners 
have a more difficult task. They propose the creation of 
two great axes, tangential to the present agglomeration, 
one  running  north  and  the  other  south of the  Seine. 
From the tangent axes the new towns and other urban 
developments will,  as it were, be suspended, eventually 
transforming the structure of the Paris metropolis from 
a  strongly radial one to a  kind of giant ladder headed 
downstream in the general direction of Rouen and Le 
Havre. Even the new Strategy Plan for southeast Eng-
land has its tangential axis, running from Foulness and 
the  proposed  South  Essex  developments  through  the 
new town areas north of London to link  with the M 1 
motorway  towards  Milton  Keynes  and  Birmingham. 
So  London  too  could  in  the  end  change  its  shape. 
What must however be said in conclusion is  that these 
great  metropolitan  plans  are  enormously  expensive  to 
implement.  Every  government  has  to  choose  between 
investing  in  motorways,  new  towns  and  other  forms 
of development and investing in other desirable schem-
es,  like hospitals or regions suffering from high unem-
ployment  or  Concorde  airliners.  The  metropolitan 
region  plans for expansion  of our great cities  may be 
long in the implementation.  Meanwhile the cities  have 
a habit of continuing to grow. ··, 
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